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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the political economy of developing the modern Chinese
automobile industry. By using qualitative research method, especially case study, and
developmental rent management analysis framework, the author analyzed the
development in three different time periods since the Chinese economic reform in
1978. Case studies of learning period, developing period and new Chinese owned
enterprises after joining WTO presented different policies and rent management
strategies arranged by the state to industrialize and develop the modern Chinese
automobile industry. Although there are failures involved in the arrangement, China
finally industrialized and developed its modern automobile industry and became the
world’s largest automobile manufacturing country since 2009. This thesis provided
evidences that developing countries cannot easily develop their own industry
successfully without the well-designed interventions from the state.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

China is considered the most successful example of economic development,
growth, and human development, having made great strides over the last four decades.
China has had a transition economy since 1978, when the Reform and Opening Up
policy transformed a heavily planned economy to a mostly market one. Unlike
Russia’s painful economic transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Chinese transition maintained a high growth rate and improved living standards (Yao,
2014). In 1978 China had a relatively low GDP of US$149.541 billion, which grew to
US$11.008 trillion in 2015 (World Bank, 2017a). China’s GDP annual growth rate
averaged nearly 10% until 2016; its highest growth rate was 15.139% (in 1984) and
its lowest rate was 3.907% (in 1990) (World Bank, 2017b). Since 2010 China has
ranked as the world’s second-largest economy.
Prior to 1978, China’s government mainly focused on its state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), especially those in heavy industries for national defense. Most of
these SOEs were established in the 1950s with help from the Soviet Union. During
the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976), however, China’s industries fell far behind all
other advanced economies. In the earlier period of Reform and Opening Up, China’s
industrial goals were to rapidly expand its exports and transform heavy industries into
light industries capable of producing consumer goods. The transformation to a market
1

economy allowed private owned enterprises to become more significant players in the
economy. Percentage share of industry in GDP increased from an average of 39.18%
prior to 1978 to an average of 45% between 1979 and 2015; this share peaked at
47.559% in 2006 (World Bank, 2017c). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, China had
the world’s largest labor-intensive cotton textile industry, which, by the late 1990s,
had been replaced by heavy industries and high technology industry. Another leader is
the machinery industry, which in 2015 reached a total value of US$3.53 trillion and
exported US$288 billion in machinery tools (China Machinery, 2016). The rapid
industrialization could not have been achieved without trade liberalization and exportoriented support from the Chinese government.
One of China’s most successful advancements has been its international trade
and integration into the global economy. International trade not only promotes
economic growth but also generates a country’s industrialization by efficiently
allocating resources, including natural resources, human capital, and financial assets
(Helleiner, 1992, 1995; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015).
International trade in China has grown rapidly over the past several decades. In 1992
the total value of exports was US$84.940 billion, with a surplus of US$4.355 billion,
in comparison to imports of US$80.585 billion. At that time, China’s largest trading
partner was Hong Kong, with a total trading value of US$37.512 billion. After 22
years of ongoing development, China reached its trading peak with a total export
value of US$2.342 trillion in 2014. Additionally, the trading surplus was US$384.322
billion and exports were US$1.958 trillion. China’s largest trading partner changed
2

from Hong Kong to the United States, and the primary exports changed from laborintensive textiles and clothing to technology-intensive machineries and electronics
(World Bank, 2017d, 2017e).
China greatly improved its 1990 low score of 0.499 on the Human
Development Index (HDI), attaining a score of 0.734 in 2014. China currently ranks
90th out of 195 countries and territories on the HDI (United Nations Development
Programme, 2017a). Other data include that, as of 2016, expected schooling is 13.5
years, the gross enrollment in tertiary schools is 39% and secondary schools is 94%.
The employment rate is 67.6% of the population older than 15 years old (United
Nations Development Programme, 2017b). With such significant changes in human
development, China upgraded its labor market from a mostly unskilled labor force
into one featuring increasingly sophisticated workers (Hsu, 2015).
As noted above, China’s economy grew exponentially, and with it so did
highway construction. In 2014 China had a total of 4.46 million kilometers of
highway, including 162,600 kilometers of toll roads (Department of Road, 2015).
This is striking, given that China built its first highway only in 1984. By the end of
2015, it had built a total of 123,000 kilometers of highway.
This massive road infrastructure is needed because the automobile industry
has become one of China’s most successful industrial developments. By 2009 China
produced the most automobiles in the world, which is astounding when compared to
how undeveloped its automobile industry was in 1978. The first Chinese automobile
was made in 1931, but the development of the automobile industry was interrupted by
3

the Japanese invasion in the same year. After World War II, and immediately after the
Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), China built its first automobile factory in 1953 with
help from the Soviet Union. The Chinese automobile industry grew slowly because of
a state policy that wanted the industry to freeze technology and only copy existing
models from other countries. This policy was designed to fill the large demand for
automobiles even as the industry had poor productivity.
The Reform and Opening Up policy in 1978 boosted not only China’s
economy but also its automobile industry. The first joint venture between a Chinese
carmaker and a foreign manufacturer was in 1984, and from that time onward the
Chinese modern automobile industry continued to develop. According to the Chinese
Automobile Industry Year Book 1983, there were 2,456 firms, including both
automobile and motorcycle. In 1982 the total output was 8.21 billion RMB, with
942,821 workers (Automobile Industry Year Book, 1983). By 2015 there were 13,213
firms, with a total output of 3.33 trillion RMB (China Industry Information Net,
2016). In 2012 the automobile industry provided 4.249 million jobs in China. At that
time, it was expected that employment in this one industry would exceed 10 million
jobs in 2016 (Zou, 2016).
Technological upgrading improved significantly in the automobile industry. In
1984, at the beginning of a joint venture between China’s SAIC and Germany’s
Volkswagen, China assembled its VW Santana using the completely knocked down
method. The only parts produced in China were radios and other smaller parts. By
2001, however, the Chinese local firms had grown so well that they started to export
4

its production lines and factories overseas. Since 2009 China has manufactured the
most vehicles globally. Another significant change was that China moved from
simply copying cars to developing its own hybrid and electrical vehicles with
independent intellectual property rights.
China’s development and growth come with certain side effects.
Environmental pollution has become a major issue and threat to public health. With
tax revenue being the sole focus of local government, highly polluting enterprises that
would have paid prohibiting pollution penalties in other countries are attracted, even
invited, to move their plants to China, where limited environmental regulations are in
place to control the pollution (Tanpaifang, 2014). Lack of supervision becomes de
facto encouragement for high polluting firms to only utilize their purification
equipment during a governmental inspection, in order to reduce operating cost
(Tanpaifang, 2014).
The primary source of air pollution used to be the coal use in industrial
electricity generation, but the total volume of pollution was decreased since 1996
with enhanced regulation by the government. Nowadays, in major cities vehicular
emission instead has become the major issue caused by the rapid expansion of
automobile industry and the economy (Liu, 2004). The air pollution caused a 20
billion Chinese Yuan loss annually; death caused by lung cancer increased 0.02% in
urban area; acid rain spreads to 30% area of the country (Economic & Trade Herald,
2001). The statistics shows the necessity of reducing air pollution. Initiatives to
reduce traffic congestion and emission include limiting both vehicle purchase and
5

vehicle use (e.g., only a passenger car with a plate number ending in an odd number
can be on the street on an odd calendar date) An example of other measures to reduce
emission is that Beijing and Shanghai provide subsidies and ―free license plate‖ (i.e.,
no registration fee) to encourage residents to purchase electrical vehicles and hybrid
cars.
To accommodate the inevitable process of urbanization, more and more rural
land has been claimed by the government to build new cities and infrastructure.
Residents of such land – usually farmers – will have to be relocated. These residents
will receive monetary compensation; most of the times they are also promised an
apartment in the area after the new city is established. While seemingly fair, the
largest hardship caused by urbanization to those farmers is that they may lose their
only income source – farming - if they do not have any skills other than agriculture.
They then become low-skilled workers in manufacture or construction industry.
Urbanization brings phenomenal profit to local government and construction
companies, motivating them to illegally force residents to leave their land and
property. Social instability thus takes root.
China’s political and institutional structures have changed alongside with its
economic reform. Guanghui Zhou (2011) stated that, policy making system is the
core of China’s political system, as well as the crucial element that determines the
development of China, in particular China’s automobile industry. China’s policy
making system, founded since the year 1949. It consists of five branches, namely the
Communist party, government, military, legislation and citizens form the policy
6

making system. Previously, significant policies were published under the name of the
central committee of the Communist party, state council and central military council
therefore the policy making system was called ―party, government and military
system‖. Since the economic reform and opening up in 1978, political system has also
evolved. Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party
of China and the State Council became the two major policy making bodies. The
political power also decentralized; functions and power are dispersed away from
central government to specific offices and bureaus. The policy making process has
become more democratic and use scientific method rather than empiricism as before.
Think tanks and experts become more significant to influence the policy making
processes (Yan, 2014). Recently, central government will hear public opinions before
officially legislating a policy. The relationship between national government and local
government also change from a command-and-obedience one to a more democratic
one. Local governments have the right to provide suggestions as well as feedback to
the national government. It is also within the local government’s responsibility to
report the status of policy implementation and the public opinion. In addition, they
can negotiate with the central government on how to implement a policy while
accommodating their local interest (Yan, 2014).
Despite the progresses and setbacks that China achieved since its economic
reform, this thesis specifically focuses on the industrial development of China’s
automobile industry; why and how it took place; and the processes, incentives, and
pressure that helped develop the industry. My research question is: What were the
7

political, institutional, and industry mechanisms that created the conditions for
industrialization of the Chinese automobile industry?
The second chapter is a review of the literature of economic growth. It is
China’s economic growth that helped to develop the automobile industry; the state
played a significant role in managing resources and creating industrial policies. The
third chapter addresses the methodology of qualitative research, which includes three
case studies of three different periods of development in the automobile industry. The
Developmental Rent Management Analysis framework is used to observe rent
management in a political context and to analyze how incentives and pressures to
develop the industry affected institutional and industrial organizations. The fourth
chapter presents the three case studies: the first is the learning period (1978–1991),
the second is the developing period (1992–2000), and the third is the period of new
SOEs and private firms (2001–2014).
The three periods are defined according to shifting in policies, market system
and types of investment. During the learning period, the policies simply focus on
modernizing China’s automobile industry; there was no clear goal for the
development of this industry. In 1992, government started setting clear goals for the
industry and gaining a deeper understanding on how to develop the automobile
industry. In this thesis the years of 1992 to 2000 are set to be the developing period.
China joined WTO in 2001. As a result, Chinese firms started facing both
international and domestic competitions. Chinese private firms and new SOEs
gradually become influential, and thus I set such time range for the third period. The
8

conclusion offers observations of China’s successes and critiques of the failures in its
automobile industry.

9

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature of industrial development. Industrial
development requires two main factors: (1) the role of economic growth, and (2) the
role of the state in managing resources and industrial policies. Economic growth for
the long term requires technological change, especially in the case of developing
countries because they must close the technological gaps with developed countries.
Industrialization for developing countries is incredibly difficult without state
intervention.

2.1 Three Models of Growth Based on Technological Change
2.1.1. Solow Growth Model
Neoclassical economist Robert Solow presented that technological change is
at the core of growth. He based his model on a closed economy that had diminishing
returns to scale and that assumed capital, labor, and knowledge or technology changes
are fixed (Van den Berg, 2012). In his model, production function is fixed.
Additionally, labor and capital are the only two inputs in the production process, and
they can be substituted for each other. According to Van den Berg (2012), with the
assumption of no technology change and no labor growth, the new capital produced is
generated from depreciating old capital with effective labor; thus, the aggregate
10

output is constant returns to scale. The model assumes constant supply of labor,
which means that economic growth can be generated only from accumulated capital
savings in the medium term from a temporary steady state. With diminishing returns
to scale of any single input, economic growth is not a straight forward function of
investment (capital savings); that is, depreciation results in the last unit of newly
produced capital accumulating less capital stock than the previous unit (Van den Berg,
2012). Thus, economic growth will cease even if investment (capital savings)
continues as a constant percentage of output; continued growth in output cannot be
generated, even with a constant rate of savings and investment. To achieve long-term
sustainable growth, Solow argues that a country needs technological progress to
effectively reduce or eliminate diminishing returns (Van den Berg, 2012).
Technological progress effectively reduces or eliminates diminishing returns. Given
the fixed-capital supply, technological progress is not, for example, about making
more tools in the same way but in making them with advanced machines or
innovative techniques; hence, improving overall production capacity. The Solow
growth model argues that only technological changes can lead to permanent economic
growth at a steady state (Van den Berg, 2012). Solow did not address the dynamics of
technological change in his model.

2.1.2. Schumpeterian Research and Development Model
Unlike Solow, Joseph Schumpeter provided substantial insights into how
technological change pushes economic growth forward. Schumpeter pointed out that
11

technological progress is a dynamic process of profit-driven technological
competition, in which innovators with advanced new technologies or innovations can
generate additional profits; these new innovations could lead to new products with
better quality, lower prices, and more attractive features than the existing ones on the
market (Van den Berg, 2012). Schumpeter also pointed out innovation has up-front
costs of required time and money needed for equipment, location, and knowledge to
create new technologies (Van den Berg, 2012), and that these costs deserve to be
recovered. Thus, any profits should be treated and protected as incentives for firms to
keep innovating new technologies. Temporary monopoly rents can attract innovators
to engage in technological competition, which, in turns, can lead to comparative
advantages. According to Schumpeter, under competitive equilibrium, the price of
each product equals the cost of production and there is no profit. Profits only arise
with the dynamic changes that result from innovation, and they continue only until
the innovation moves into general use by other companies (Van den Berg, 2012).
Temporary profits are generated from technological competition. The force of
competition will eliminate all profits by replacing existing innovations with new
innovations created by innovators; this is the dynamic process that Schumpeter called
creative destruction (Van den Berg, 2012). The constant process of creative
destruction across many segments of an economy is the source of increased economic
development and overall standards of living (Van den Berg, 2012). In Schumpeter’s
model, dynamic technological changes push economic growth forward.
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2.1.3. Romer Model of Technological Change
In Paul Romer’s model, management of resources supports technological
change and technological change is endogenous (Van den Berg, 2012). According to
Romer’s model, all things being equal, the high number of innovations in an economy
shifts equilibrium of costs and profits of innovation rightward; that is, the profit of
innovation will be increased for innovators (Van den Berg, 2012). Profit-driven
innovation activities will stimulate new innovations that could bring greater profits to
innovators and, in turn, give profitable innovators access to more resources that could
be used for their new innovations. With the idea that newly created products and
techniques are better, cheaper, and more attractive than existing ones; innovators
could allocate scarce resources more efficiently in creating new innovations (Van den
Berg, 2012). In the imperfect competitive market, innovators understand their own
innovations will destroy earlier innovations but also that future innovations created by
other competitors will replace their innovations as well. With scarce resources and
other costs, innovators must analyze their expected returns and costs of innovation
throughout the innovative process.
Innovators will stop innovating when their profits equal the costs of
innovation (Van den Berg, 2012). In Romer’s model, new ideas are easier to create
because they are based on existing ideas. The more existing ideas there are, the more
new ideas can be created. This accumulation of knowledge leads to an acceleration in
technological change; new innovations can be sold with a larger profit margin in a
creative economy, and successful innovators value future potential gains with a much
13

higher expectation (Van den Berg, 2012). In this situation, the market force will
allocate more resources to innovative sectors than will a less creative economy. Thus,
the larger economies of developed countries experience greater technological change
and innovate faster than poorer, smaller countries (Van den Berg, 2012).
Clearly, Solow, Schumpeter, and Romer offer three different models to
illustrate how economic growth is generated from technological change. Solow does
not discuss the dynamics of such change in detail; Schumpeter describes
technological competition as a process of creative destruction and as the driving force
of economic growth; and Romer demonstrates how effective allocations of scarce
resource accelerate technological change. Additionally, Solow asserts that perfect
competition by itself will make an economy efficient, while Schumpeter and Romer
argue that innovators need protection and incentives to improve technology or create
more advanced techniques. Under the Schumpeterian model, profits made by existing
innovators offer real advantages to future innovators, such being able to lobby the
government for more protection or barriers that favor their existing market power.
State regulations of monopolistic behaviors are thus crucial in developing a country’s
economy and its industries.

14

2.2 Role of the State in Managing Industrial Development and Technological
Changes
2.2.1. Purposes of Industrial Policies
Friedrich List argues that a nation’s true wealth is the development of its
productive power; that is, power is created from the interaction among its intellectual
capital, natural capital, and material capital (Levi-Faur, 1997). There are four
characteristics that describe the development of a state’s productive power: (1) the
aggregate development of the entire economy; (2) the coordination of societal
conflicts that maintain social stability and national interests; (3) the balancing of longterm goals with short-term needs; and (4) the suitability with the native culture (e.g.,
people’s beliefs). These four characteristics of productive power require the state to
play a significant role in development process: only the state can coordinate all
sectors in the economy. List’s approach to economic development and the role of the
state is a stark contrast to Adam Smith, who argued that the primary causes of
development are the division of labor and accumulation of capital. In Smith’s theory,
it is the invisible hands of the free market to smooth out everything in the society. In
contrast, List argued that the state must protect its productive power; he suggested
that the state should protect its infant industries through a broad range of policies
designed to accelerate industrialization and economic growth (Levi-Faur, 1997). In
order to accelerate the economic development in a developing country, governments
should use industrial policies and create rents (for example, benefits or resources) to
achieve the goals of development.
15

2.2.1.1. Promoting Technological Change
Economic growth requires technological change, especially for developing
countries, because technological upgrading promotes their economic development
and allows them to catch up with the technological capability of developed countries.
These changes always occur at the firm level: domestic firms in developing countries
learn and adapt the new technologies that were developed and innovated in developed
countries (Amsden, 2009). During the learning and adopting process, the productivity
and capability of a developing country will be expanded significantly; according to
Ngo (2017, p. 5), ―acquisition of tacit knowledge1 requires a great deal of effort,
financial resources, and time.‖ Therefore, the state must help entrepreneurs to reduce
the technology gap that List pointed out (Levi-Faur, 1997). From the parsimonious
strategy, the industrial policies of developing countries should focus on improving
their existing production activities, which, in turn, might result in higher productivity
and better quality of products. From this comes an increased opportunity for new
products to emerge (Hausmann, Rodrik, & Sabel, 2007).
Freeman (1977) offers a prime example. In the nineteenth century, Britain had
the most key innovations in the mechanical industry. The Prussian government set up
technical training institutes to train German technicians to reverse-engineer the
imported British machines, and it also attracted British technicians to Prussia to help
its technicians learn tacit knowledge. As a result, Prussia replaced Britain as the

1Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that is difficult to transfer to another person by means of writing it
down or verbalizing it. It can only be learned from training or hands-on experience.
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world’s leading machinery manufacturer in the last half of nineteenth century. Kruz
(1992) offers a complementary example by describing how West Germany followed a
similar path as Prussia after World War II. The West German government highly
supported its innovative small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The government’s
strategy was to focus on improving its existing products and technologies. Deep
penetration in a narrow part of a niche market, with highly modified and improved
products, resulted in West Germany having the highest GDP in Western Europe
during the Cold War.

2.2.1.2. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment
Weak technological capabilities as well as lack of resources and skilled labor,
forces developing countries to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI) in the forms of
foreign resources, knowledge, technology, and training. The transfer of technology
and the tacit knowledge of how to use this technology are two of the benefits that
foreign investors provide to developing countries. This acquisition and diffusion of
technology can lead to improvement in a developing country’s productivity and
growth. Therefore, developing countries rely on imported technologies, especially
from foreign investors, in order to gradually build their capability and improve their
productivity.
It should be noted that adapting imported technology is more challenging
than buying it, although the process of localizing advanced imported technology in
domestic firms could increase productivity levels and ―strengthen international
17

competitiveness by supplying value-added goods‖ (Ngo, 2017, p. 4). For instance, the
Singapore government provided grants to foreign firms that transferred advanced
technologies that allowed the state to become more competitive; and the government
also worked closely with multinational corporations (MNCs) to understand what
types of skilled workers were needed, and then it provided training to the necessary
workers for MNCs (Lall, 2004). To attract foreign investors to set up their factories in
Singapore during the development of its electronics industry in 1970s, the Singapore
government subsidized supporting industries, transportation, and communication
infrastructures, as well as trained the relevant skilled laborers (Lall, 2004). Later,
Singapore successfully established its advanced electronics-related industries and
relocated the related labor-intensive product lines to neighboring countries (Lall,
2004).
Tacit knowledge, which takes time and effort, is learned during the production
process, and is required for local firms to upgrade their technologies and facilities.
Nevertheless, Saggi (2002), among other scholars, suggested that developing
countries should instead attract foreign firms and FDI with the use of subsidies, and
should give up localization and adaptation of advanced technology. Additionally,
technology transfers can be prevented; for example, if the developed country
sanctions a developing country or prohibits a technology for international transfer.
Technology transfers are neither voluntary nor automatic because foreign firms want
to retain their most valuable knowledge and innovations at home (Ngo, 2017); for
example, ―multinational corporations are important source of capital investment, they
18

often carry relatively limited technology transfer, with the most tacit forms of
knowledge and a good deal of R&D activities kept in developed countries‖ (Cimoli,
Dosi, & Stiglitz, 2009, p. 8).
This could be avoided if the state focuses not only on attracting FDI but also
on setting up an agenda that ensures the localization of foreign technology. Without
this step, domestic technologies may fail to upgrade, leaving the developing country
permanently dependent on the foreign technology and with only its own low-tech and
low-value-added activities (Warren, 2007).

2.2.1.3. Stimulating Firms Capability Building and Promoting Technological
Learning
Localization of an advanced technology requires entrepreneurs to invest effort,
time, and capital into the process. If entrepreneurs must bear the full cost of these
business ventures and risks, they are less likely to engage in self-discovery processes
or the necessary risks associated with trying to achieve higher technological
capability (Rodrik, 2004). Many development projects require long-term and largescale investments before they can achieve beneficial outcomes. Private entrepreneurs
do not have the resources or abilities to arrange all the necessary connections in
related sectors and might not have the financial resources for the significant upfront
costs; these coordination failures occur when new industries require economies of
scale and non-tradable inputs in a specific region (Rodrik, 1993). Thus, an industry
cannot develop itself without direct government intervention because industrial
19

policies require centralization and prioritization. A well-designed state industrial
policy can both widen the range of development along the country’s production
frontier and stimulate jumps in capacity building (Hausmann, Rodrik, & Sabel, 2007).
One example of this need for state policy is when the government of South
Korea selected some private firms to which it allocated large up-front costs, subsidies,
and privileges to build economies of scale, which eventually led to large (still private)
conglomerates. These conglomerates, known as chaebols, were mainly focused in the
heavy industries; they allowed South Korea to specialize and learn complex
technologies from abroad (Lall, 2004). These government-backed, export-driven
chaebols developed impressive technological capabilities from this strategy.
Simultaneously, during the learning phase, the government highly protected the
domestic market. As a result, South Korea is now one of the most successful countries
in automobile manufacturing and the most successful in commercial ship
manufacturing (Lall, 2004).
In another example, Taiwan, a province of China, had focused on supporting
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in its advanced technology industry.
Initially, local firms in Taiwan had little capability to absorb new foreign technologies.
Hence, the government played an active role in helping SMEs to locate, purchase,
diffuse and adapt these new foreign technologies. In some cases, the government
itself entered into joint ventures as a public enterprise, especially in manufacturing
semiconductors and throughout the aerospace industry (Lall, 2004).
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2.2.2. Managing Policies and Rents
Political context and political change are two major factors that affect the rent
management system. Political context gives important insights into the interactions
among stage agents, policy making system and the possibility of effective or
ineffective implementation of policies (Khan and Jomo, 2000). Rent seeking operates
through the political structure of a developing country formally and informally; the
ability to affect technological change and upgrading determine whether rent-seeking
can successfully assist economic growth (Khan and Jomo, 2000). In developing
countries, the relationship between the state and business sector is always
complicated. Informal relationships frequently came into being behind formal
institutional structure and relationships, so details of a policy depend on the political
context of said country, and such policy has to be accepted by different political stage
agents. Studying political context and political change can help us understand rent in
certain political context can be value-enhancing or value-reducing, the possibility of
effective or ineffective implementation of the policy.
Industrial policies create rents because they generate new benefits for firms.
Neoliberal economists argue, however, that businesses are incentivized to lobby the
government for rents, which often shifts state–business relationships away from
productive activities, as entrepreneurs devote their time and resources to capturing
windfall rents (Krueger 1974). Ultimately, the inefficiency that results from rent and
rent seeking creates economic waste and losses. Based on these insights, neoclassical
economists, including Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980) and Krueger (1974),
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suggest that avoiding rent creation and rent seeking reduces social welfare loss
because resources devoted to the rent-seeking processes are not used in value-added
productive activities. However, Khan (2000) argues that the overall effect of rent
seeking—the rent outcome created and actual costs of rent—must be analyzed. From
this perspective, rent could be redistributive or developmental when the positive
outcome outweighs the cost of rent. In the context of development, the government
plays a significant role in creating an effective rent management system to ensure that
rents are value enhancing and developmental, despite the costs associated with rent
seeking (Khan, 2000; Ngo, 2013).
According to Rodrik (2004), the management of industrial policy or rents
depends on the political and economic contexts of the specific developing country,
since the context varies from one country to another. A certain policy that works well
in one developing country might not fit the circumstances of another country.
Furthermore, ―economic development requires the role of the state to create and
regulate the economic and political relationships that can support sustained
industrialization, or, in short, a developmental state‖ (Chang, 1999, p. 183).
Developing countries must follow international conditionality and must find their
own roles in the global economy, but this cannot be achieved without state
intervention (Bolesta, 2007). For instance, Vietnam followed China’s economic
reform model (in Vietnam it was called Doi Moi), although it was more cautious than
China in its reform policies and activities (Pesek, 2013). Learning from the Chinese
experience (that is, moving from a planned to a market economy), Vietnam decided to
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focus on enhancing its SOEs by using foreign technology (Pesek, 2013). It still faced
similar problems as China, such as party elites getting rich from the development;
however, Vietnam’s challenge is more manageable because its SOEs are relatively
smaller than China’s (Pesek, 2013).

2.2.2.1 Providing Incentives in Policies
To overcome lack of information or firms’ profit-seeking behaviors, a
government should provide both incentives and guidance on how to grow and
develop its industries. Firms do not have these resources to collect enough
information for the economy, even information in their participated industry; only a
government’s political and economic powers can help them collect myriad
information from all sectors. A developing country’s government usually creates
industry associations and then works closely with them to analyze the current state of
the industry and the economy. This gives firms a better understanding of the different
business and national scenarios, which can then be used to create both long-term and
short-term strategies. A state can also often offer tax cuts and subsidies, as well as
invest in human capital, as a well-trained labor force is vital when developing an
industry. Government grants and scholarships can be offered in certain fields to attract
talent and promote innovation, because a well-trained labor force is important for
developing an industry.
For example, in order to develop its export industries, South Korea hosts
monthly meetings between leading exporters and high-ranking officials. The
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government and the firms together set goals for industry, as well as firm and product
levels (Lall, 2004). In another example, to be more competitive in the international
market, the Singapore government set goals to maximize learning, increase
technological acquisition, decrease the technological gap, and improve both the skills
and incomes of the working class. It realized that it had to be ―willing to contribute
capital, tax concessions, infrastructure, education and skills training, and a stable and
friendly business environment‖ (Lall, 2004, p. 18).
As noted throughout this chapter, economic growth is driven by technological
change. However, technological change has significant upfront costs but success is
uncertain. With the natural tendency of firms to be attracted to profit, they may not
invest long-term in technological change and innovation. Research and development
(R&D) is expensive, which is why a government should support these types of
activities. Technology upgrading and adaptation requires time and effort (Freeman,
1997). Subsidies and tax cuts can support firms as they struggle to learn and develop.
For example, West Germany, in the 1980s, provided funding for basic research and
supported its industries’ R&D’s long-term objectives: 20% of federal R&D funding
went toward basic research, 4% went toward subsidies and investments for R&D
activities, and 4% went toward technology-oriented new firms (Kruz, 1992).
Additionally, without government intervention, financial institutions may not
have incentives to fund risky investment projects. This is a market failure that often
prevents productive firms from investing in new, advanced technologies. However,
firms that can access financial resources might request a change to their original
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interest and alter their strategies to engage in sectors that have a much faster—and
higher—return on profits. This occurred in China in recent years, when many Chinese
SOEs shifted from traditional industries to China’s real estate market after it rapidly
expanded. For example, China Poly Group Corporation, which participated in the
international trade market in both civilian goods and national defense equipment,
turned to the real estate market, becoming the largest investor in 2009 (Tian, 2010).
From this perspective, free markets (instead of state oversight and protections)
and poorly managed industrial policies cannot help develop an industry. As noted
above, and in review, market failures are assumed away by neoclassical economists,
while heterodox economists believe that markets alone cannot resolve market failures,
especially for developing countries, and thus state intervention is necessary to correct
market failures (Ngo, 2013).

2.2.2.2 Compulsion for Performance
As covered in this chapter, rent creation can provide benefits to help firms
develop within an industry. However, these rents should be removed gradually after
firms prove themselves capable of competition in the market. The government needs
simultaneously to provide benefits that support an infant industry and create
developmental goals and performance measures, including punitive measures: if firms
or an industry cannot perform as expected, the state withdraws the rent. This would
create pressure for firms to put in real effort in learning and developing. In some
cases, a significant fine could be imposed on firms that received resources from the
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government but failed to develop properly. In an extreme scenario, a firm, or even an
entire industry, could be shut down to protect other developmental strategies. The
goal, of course, is for a government to pick those firms or industries that will succeed,
but it also must protect itself if the firms or industries become unsuitable for the
country’s developmental strategy (Rodrik, 2004).
For example, Singapore, a free-trade country, instituted highly interventionist
policies that promoted and deepened its industries, and its government acted firmly to
guide transnational corporations (TNCs) to follow Singapore’s development strategies
(Lall, 2004). Singapore provided significant amounts of resources and concessions to
TNCs, but it also punished firms that had low performances (Lall, 2004). Rents from
the government were removed if a firm could not survive rapid competition in
domestic and international markets; many multinational factories had to shut down or
relocate their facilities to neighboring countries because of their low-value-added and
labor-intensive products (Lall, 2004). Punitive policies helped Singapore avoid the
industrial hollowing out that, for example, Hong Kong suffered in its textile industry.
Through its supportive and punitive policies, Singapore successfully upgraded its
labor-intensive industries into high-tech industries.

2.3 Literature Review: Summary
This chapter has provided a brief literature review of why the role of state and
proper rent management can help grow industries in developing countries. First, it
reviewed three development models: (1) technological change is at the core of the
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economic growth, and the nature of technological change is that new technology
replaces existing technology, which leads to permanent economic growth (Solow’s
model); (2) technological progress is a dynamic process that involves profit-driven
technological competition, called creative destruction, which is the source of
economic development resulting in increased standards of living (Schumpeter’s
model); (3) technological change is endogenous, and efficient allocation of resources
can boost technological change (Romer’s model).
Next, this chapter reviewed the literature from mainstream and development
economists on how technological change and innovations enhance economic growth.
However, this process requires the role of state and its interventions to support and
develop firms’ and industries’ capacity. The purpose of industrial policies is to
promote technological change, attract foreign direct investments, and stimulate
capability building and technology growth. However, rent seeking must be managed
appropriately by the state. State intervention should provide both incentives and
pressures to push firms and industries to achieve certain conditions of performance.
Successful management of industrial policies and rent seeking could greatly benefit
developing countries in growing their industrial sectors.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Methodology
The research for this thesis, which specifically studies the automobile industry
in China, employs qualitative and case study analyses to assess its industrial
development. As noted in the previous chapter, China has developed rapidly since
1978, including economically and politically, even though the state’s initial
developmental goals were unclear and were changed frequently due to rapid
development. Thus, qualitative research, and in particular case study analysis, is the
best choice to understand the nuances and timeline of China’s development of its
automobile industry. For this thesis, the development of the automobile industry has
been broken into three periods: 1978–1991, 1992–2000, and 2001–2014.
There are several advantages to using the case study method in research. First,
it provides the ability to have an in-depth analysis with a relatively small number of
cases (Starr, 2014). Second, information collected from multiple resources helps
create consistent, reliable, and empirical patterns to understand the phenomena of
interest. Third, dynamic processes—such as of research and development and
technology adoption, cooperation, and/or competition among firms in different
political contexts across time can be hard to quantify, but can be analyzed using a
case study (Starr, 2014). For this thesis, qualitative research and case studies of three
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periods provide a way to study China’s dynamic economic process in developing its
automobile industry.
Nevertheless, there are also limitations to using case studies. To make this type
of research valuable and reliable, the researcher must have a research process that is
fair and free of personal judgments and perspectives. The researcher also has to
analyze information from multiple sources because a single resource will not provide
enough data (Piore, 1979). Qualitative research and case studies are less reliable to
explain theories; however, they are useful to identify and characterize causal
processes (Starr, 2014).
Due to the rapid development of China’s economy and political environment
since 1978, the collection method of statistical data has varied considerably, including
the different types of ownership within the automobile industry. With unreliable
official data, unquantifiable information, and varying developmental strategies, using
qualitative research and case studies is the best choice for my research, which is the
in-depth analysis of the historical and political contexts and the institutional and
industrial mechanisms behind the development of the China’s automobile industry.
This type of information is hard to quantify, and as noted above, this makes it difficult
to use quantitative research.
In this thesis a successful qualitative research is defined based on two criteria..
First, researchers must carefully cross-check qualitative data obtained either from
primary or secondary sources through the literature or across primary data itself
(Helper, 2000; Starr, 2014). Second, an analytical framework must provide an
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appropriate tool to guide the completeness of the case study (Starr, 2014). This thesis
aims at providing insight on the transformation of China’s automobile industry during
each aforementioned period analyzed in the case study. Data collection and analytical
framework employed in this thesis are discussed in details in the following sections.

3.2. Data Collection
The empirical research used in this thesis includes data and information
collected from major Chinese newspapers and magazines, auto channels on reliable
websites, government websites, and from the World Bank. Being fluent in Chinese, I
was able to access original-language data.
Most data on the Chinese automobile industry were generated from the China
Automobile Industry Yearbook, which was first established in 1983 by the China
Automobile Technology and Research Center and China Association of Automobile
Manufactures. It collects official data and information from all firms in China’s
automobile industry. It also collects government leaders’ significant opinions and
speeches as well as government orders and policy documents. All of this data are
published yearly as a summary of the industry. Thus, the China Automobile Industry
Yearbook is the best source to study this industry in-depth and with a clear timeline.
Major newspapers and automobile magazines and websites have significant
influence in China. Many of the staff members of these media are former government
officials or professionals and experts who worked in the automobile industry for a
long time, so they have considerable insights.
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All the data collected were double-checked and triangulated across different
media, government websites, and articles written by professionals. I am confident that
I have used the most reliable data sources available for my case studies.

3.3. Analytical Approach
Various methodological approaches have been combined to illustrate this
research. It starts with a literature review of theoretical debates, including from
critical economists and neoclassical economists on technological adoption; upgrading;
foreign direct investment (FDI); research and development; and the roles of the state,
rent, rent seeking, and rent management. Related issues are discussed in the literature
review to answer the research question of this thesis: What were the political,
institutional, and industry mechanisms that created the conditions for industrialization
of China’s automobile industry?
I use the developmental rent management analysis (DRMA) framework,
developed by Ngo (2016), as the analytical framework for the case studies. The
DRMA framework was used to analyze the factors that affected the technological
adoption, upgrading, and role of FDI in building capability and industrializing and
modernizing China’s automobile industry in the one-party Chinese government after
1978. The DRMA framework focuses on rent management strategies in state-owned
enterprises (SOE)–joint venture relationships, which ensured development of the firm,
industry, and national levels under guided state policies. Successful rent management
strategies must relate closely to a country’s political and institutional contexts and its
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specific domestic and international situations; one country cannot simply copy
directly from another country and expect to be as successful. The DRMA framework
provides a way to analyze how rents are created, allocated, and managed, and how to
evaluate rent outcomes and rent seeking and rent management results in the
developmental outcome of a developing country. Figure 3.1 details the four steps of
the DRMA framework.
Figure 3.1. The DRMA Framework

Source: Ngo 2016, p. 1051.
The first step of the Ngo’s DRMA framework is to identify the political
context of rent creation and management. Understanding the political context is very
important because: (1) economic institutions are created and supervised by political
processes; (2) rent management counterbalances social conflicts; and (3) rent
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management associated with political, industrial, and economic contexts affect a
state’s future. According to Ngo (2016), there are four types of rents: learning,
Schumpeterian, monopoly, and redistributive. These rents are created by government
policies and the nature of market: they can be value-enhancing rents if they increase
the market, but they can also be value-reducing rents if they cause market failure.
Identifying the types of rent created provides fundamental information for the second
step in the DRMA framework, which is to analyze and understand the mechanisms of
different policies and policy-making structures in managing each rent under a
country’s particular contexts. Once a rent is created, it will have both intended and
unintended effects. Evaluating the rent created for a specific situation and its rent
outcome is vital. The third step of the DRMA framework is to understand the specific
market and industrial structures of the country under study. Ngo (2016) explains that
it is the analysis of how market structures, ownerships of the firm, technological
contexts of the industry, and competition from domestic and international markets
collaborate to affect the industry and its firms. The dynamic process of rent
management requires the rent to be examined and evaluated from the perspectives of
internal and external incentives and pressures; the effects from both market and state
interventions must also be evaluated. The final step is to analyze the rent outcomes
and transformation of the firms or industry as a result of the rent creation and
management (Ngo, 2016).
In this thesis, the DRMA framework allowed for an in-depth analysis to
understand the process of technical learning and adaptation of development in
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China’s automobile industry across three periods: 1978–1991, 1992–2000, and 2001–
2014. How did the industry modernize itself in a relatively short period, and how did
it increase its capability so quickly? How and in what political and economic contexts
did SOE–joint ventures and local enterprises develop in very different directions? The
collected data, information, and evidence offer an understanding of how rent seeking
and rent management worked in tandem to develop China’s post-1978 automobile
industry, and how rent creation during this process had both positive and negative
results.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES

4.1 Learning Period (1978–1991)
4.1.1 Historical-Political Context of the Automobile Industry
In the early 1970s, China’s central government turned management of its
automobile manufacturers over to provincial and municipal governments because of
the limited supply of, yet rapidly increasing demand for, automobiles. Before 1978,
prior to the Reform and Opening Up policy, Xiaoping Deng, the most powerful leader
of China’s central committee, approved the central government’s request to import
foreign processes to modernize the Shanghai Automobile Factory. By cooperating
with foreign countries, China could manufacture both sedans and heavy trucks (Li,
2004). Deng said on several occasions: ―To develop the socialism motherland, we had
to bring not only foreign technology but also foreign capital‖ (Chen, 2014). In order
to attract foreign companies to China to develop its outdated automobile industry, the
Chinese government sent invitations to many of the world’s major automobile
enterprises. General Motors (GM) was the first foreign enterprise to show interest.
Thomas Murphy, the CEO of GM, visited China in October 1978 with the idea of a
joint venture. However, GM’s board of directors rejected Murphy’s idea because it
did not believe that China had the capability to produce cars, given its level of
industrialization (Li, 2008). Instead, the first joint venture—Beijing Jeep—was
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established between Chrysler Jeep and the Beijing Automobile Factory (Zheng, 2013).
The state’s permission to work with foreign enterprises opened a new chapter for
China’s automobile industry.
China, however, was inexperienced in working with foreign countries,
especially capitalist Western countries. Yun Chen, the vice president of Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), suggested: ―To cross a shallow river, one must follow the
rocks under the water‖; in other words, the goal was to modernize the Chinese
automobile industry, but no one knew how to do that, and so the Chinese would have
to solve problems as they arose (Han, 2014). One such issue was that cooperation
with foreign enterprises would be largely dependent on negotiations between the
Chinese government and specific foreign enterprises.
In 1954, privately owned businesses in China were confiscated, or ―purchased
by the state,‖ and so all businesses became either publicly owned or state owned.
Industries that required a large amount of capital, such as the automobile industry,
became state owned or operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and
business licenses were initially given only to existing automobile factories. The
decades of Socialism operation, only SOEs were automobile manufacturers existing
in the market, which provided monopoly rent to SOEs. As noted above, in the early
1970s, the central government turned over the management of automobile
manufacturers to provincial and local governments. To help industrialize the industry,
China’s sixth five-year plan (1980–1985) and the seventh five-year plan (1986–1990)
provided political support through nationally planned development goals developed
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by the National People’s Congress (NPC). In the sixth five-year plan, the goals for the
automobile industry were (1) to improve the quality and models of heavy trucks, offroad vehicles, and cars; (2) to increase the overhaul time from 150,000 to 200,000
kilometers, and (3) to reduce fuel consumption by 20% (National People’s Congress,
1982). The seventh five-year plan goals were (1) to develop the automobile industry
into a pillar industry; and (2) to increase technical performance of main models by the
1990s to meet the standards of the early 1980s in industrialized countries (National
People’s Congress, 1986). However, in the fifth five-year plan (1975–1980), the State
Council established that the six existing automobile manufacturers operate within the
six geographical regions in China (Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest, North
China, and South China); that is, each manufacturer supplied the automobiles only for
the region in which it was located; and the China National Automobile Trading
Corporation was to manage these dealerships and government-backed retail networks.
This meant that competition in the industry was rare.
At the time, China’s automobile industry was tightly controlled by the State
Council (Hsia, 2006). Other bureaus under the State Council, such as the First
Ministry of Machine-Building and the Ministry of Finance, worked together in the
industry (Hsia, 2006). The way they managed the industry changed several times
alongside with the political and economic reform, which will be discussed in the
following section.
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4.1.2 Institutional Mechanism of Rent Allocation
Governments, including China’s, use political power to ensure expansion of
infrastructures of an industry. To lower the costs of components and, thus, overall
costs, China’s automobile industry required both significant fixed costs and
economies of scale. Land had been provided when the factories were first established
decades ago, and the automobile manufacturers’ production lines were built at that
time. The advantage for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was access to the stateowned land. According to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1978),
the state could repurchase, require, or renationalize land; if the government wanted to
expand a factory, it could simply take the land it needed by removing and relocating
nearby residents. The privilege to obtain land with zero cost provides an informal
learning rent. If local farmers lost their rights to the land, job opportunities would be
offered to them in the factory. This was the most common compensation for
individuals living on land taken by the state.
Historically, SOEs have benefited significantly from well-trained, loyal
workers. Most SOE workers, their families, and their neighbors would work in the
same factory for generations, especially those employed in the manufacturing
industries. Workers were thus very familiar with their particular factory and
developed a strong loyalty to it. Workers’ children who graduated from middle school
would receive priority to enter the factory’s training school. This training, in turn,
would ensure quality of labor for the factory. After graduating from training school,
an individual would be placed on his or her related production line and assigned an
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experienced worker—who might be a neighbor or relative—as a master teacher.
Another significant source of workers was PLA veterans. The better the service
record as a soldier, the better the factory job as a worker. Thus, factories could boast a
team of well-trained, hardworking, and conscientious workers at a much lower cost
than hiring people outside the area. Hiring and training local children and veterans,
intended as a benefit for families and retired PLA soldiers, were not only an informal
learning rent that made SOEs benefitting from well-trained workers, but also a
redistributive rent to maintain societal order.
Nevertheless, lack of industrial pressure was a major problem for China’s
automobile industry. A state- or provisional government-owned automobile
manufacturer could get financial support from its respective government (Hsia, 2006),
and, unlike in Western countries, manufacturers did not need to worry about making
profits. The state used the automobile industry to generate tax revenues and fulfill the
production plans designed by the State Planning Commission (SPC) and PLA (He,
2010). If a manufacturer failed to meet its production plan, the government could cut
its performance bonus or possibly redeploy its employees to others departments
within the government. If a manufacturer were facing a financial loss, the appropriate
government could provide a financial subsidy by reallocating tax revenues from other
sectors. SOEs could not be shut down without permission from the State Council, and
employees were not easily fired unless a person caused a fatal accident. With SOEs,
also called ―iron bowls,‖ competition pressures and incentives were minimized for
both factories and their workers.
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Before 1982, the First Ministry of Machine-Building (FMMB) of the PRC ran
China’s automobile industry. The FMMB managed the large factories while
provincial and local Bureaus of Industry managed the small- and medium-sized
factories. Automobiles from these latter factories were ―sold,‖ or distributed, by the
State Bureau of Material Reserve (SBMR) and local Departments of Machinery. The
capital allocation to a factory was directly related to the administrative level of the
factory’s control agency; that is, the higher the administrative level of factory’s
control agency, the more capital and resources allocated to the factory (Hsia, 2006).
Additionally, large SOEs could usually get free inputs from the government, or at
considerably lower prices than from the market. This was quite disadvantage for
provincial and local small and medium factories, which had much higher input costs.
Prior to May 1984, the Department of Price decided the prices of automobiles
and its parts, and the central and local governments together distributed the
automobiles. Additionally, the ―market‖ for automobiles was mainly under the
planned economy, and there were rarely demands for automobiles from the private
sector. An average family at the time had relatively little disposable income, making it
financially impossible to own a car. An additional issue was that during this period, in
order to buy a car, one was required to get a quota from the government, and then that
quota and the cash were brought to the SBMR. For these reasons, buyers were mainly
the government, the military, and the SOEs. The automobile industry was still largely
focused on manufacturing trucks, but the state was starting to increase its production
of buses and cars.
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A new policy in 1983 requested by the Ministry of Finance, the Idea of
Change in the Commercial Tax System, incentivized enterprises to be more active and
to push the Reform and Opening Up policy. With this new policy, major SOEs no
longer had to turn over all profits to the state but only had to pay a certain proportion
in the form of taxes. In May 1984, State Council Decree 67 allowed SOEs to sell their
products on the market after they finished their state-mandated production plans in a
given year. In August 1984, the Ministry of Machinery and State Bureau of Price
loosened its control over the automobile industry, and the price of automobiles sold
directly by SOEs could vary by 10% in either direction of the original price set by the
State Bureau of Price. Finally, to create a market economy and develop
competitiveness among SOEs, investment in the automobile industry changed from
interest-free government grants to bank loans and investments that the firm generated
from both public and private sectors (Wang, 2015).
In 1985, the SBMR and the State Bureau of Price allowed SOE automobile
factories to sell their excess production at market prices. However, any automobiles
produced within the production plan had to be sold at the price set by the Department
of Price. All of these changes led to automobiles moving from being distributed in the
planned economy to being sold in a market economy (Jia, 2003).
During this period, international trade was heavily controlled by the
government. The tariff was 220% on imported automobiles; only a limited number of
licensed importers were eligible to import automobiles (China Automobile Consumer
Network, 2006). The purpose of import was to fulfill the demand for automobiles
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when domestic production was limited (Hsia, 2006). Heavy tariff and heavilycontrolled import system protected China’s infant automobile industry; they also
provided learning rent so that Chinese automakers could have space to avoid
international competition while improving their technology and production capacity.

4.1.3 Structure of Industry
Working with foreign automobile enterprises and importing their technology
were the best ways for China to narrow the gap between its weaker automobile
industry and the advanced automobile industry in Western countries. This also
attracted the foreign enterprises that wanted to enter China’s giant market. The only
option for foreign automobile enterprises to establish production lines in China was to
work with a Chinese automobile manufacturer through a joint venture (―Status of
Sino–foreign joint ventures,‖ 2011). For the Chinese automobile manufacturers,
simply importing the foreign technology was too expensive because of the high
foreign exchange rate, and foreign exchanges were controlled by the Administration
of Exchange Control. Before 1978, Chinese automobile manufacturers had to follow
the policy of ―freeze the technology, copy the existing models‖ (Cai, 1983, 37–39);
that is, up until 1978, Chinese manufacturers were not allowed to conduct any
research and development because of its high upfront costs but uncertain returns. To
develop a modern automobile industry, cooperating with a foreign enterprise thus
gave Chinese automobile manufacturers the only way to improve its technology and
production.
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SOEs and provincial and local manufacturers set up several new automobile
factories to handle the increasing demand for automobiles in China’s domestic market,
which was encouraged by policies designed to develop China’s automobile industry.
In 1982, the Automobile Department, under the First Ministry of Machine-Building,
became the China Automobile Industry Corporation (CAIC; Chinese Automobile
Industry Association Secretariat, 2009). Bin Rao, minister of the FMMB, became the
president of the CAIC, which came under the State Council. All the SOEs and
provincial and local automobile manufacturers were merged into seven integrated
regional corporations under the CAIC, and additional automobile factories were
established. Table 4.1 shows that, through the Reform and Opening Up policy, the
number of automobile factories doubled and the number of refitting factories tripled.
The number of Chinese automobile factories jumped significantly in 1985, and then
grew at a much slower rate through 1991. The growth in refitting factories was fairly
consistent between 1978 and 1991. With the increasing number of automobile
manufacturers, the production capability of the industry also improves significantly
due to collaboration with foreign enterprises. Table 4.3 in the following section shows
the increasing production capacity.

Table 4.1. Number of Chinese Automobile Factories and Refitting Factories,
1978 to 1991
Year
1978
1979
1980
1981

Automobile Manufacturers
55
55
56
57
43

Refitting Factories
173
185
192
198

1982
58
202
1983
65
207
1984
82
248
1985
114
314
1986
99
338
1987
116
347
1988
115
386
1989
119
464
1990
117
459
1991
120
486
Note: Adapted from China Automobile Industry Yearbook 1983, 1993.
Between 1984 and 1991, a Chinese automobile factory had one of three ways
to improve its technology. The first was simply to import the technology through a
joint venture. For example, the China National Heavy Duty Truck Group Company
Limited bought original design drawings and manufacturing techniques from
Germany’s Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg’s Style Heavy Truck; and Chang-An
Machinery Industry Factory imported minicar technology from Japan’s Suzuki. The
second method was to bring the foreign company’s production line to China to
produce foreign-brand automobiles in China. For example, as noted earlier, the
Beijing Automobile Factory cooperated with Chrysler Jeep to produce off-road
vehicles named Beijing-Jeep; and SAIC worked with Germany’s Volkswagen to
produce cars branded as SAIC Volkswagen. The third method was to use the market
to gain technology. For example, China purchased 40,000 Isuzu light trucks in
exchange for that truck’s design drawings (Chinese Automobile Industry Association
Secretariat, 2009). As shown in Table 4.2, the major joint ventures founded during
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this period display how China’s SOEs cooperated with world’s leading automakers in
different ways during the learning period.

Table 4.2. Major Joint Ventures Established between 1984 and 1991
Joint
Venture
Name
Beijing Jeep

Established

Foreign Firm

Joint Venture
Form

Major
Product

1984

Tianjin
Micro
Chang-An
Machinery
SAIC
Volkswagen
Qingling
Motors
Wuling
Motors
Nanjing
Automobile
Beijing Light
Automobile
FAW
Volkswagen
Jinbei Auto

1984

Chrysler
(United States)
Daihatsu
(Japan)
Suzuki (Japan)

Import
production line
Import
technology
Import
technology
Import
production line
Import
production line
Import
technology
Import
technology
Use the market

Off-road
vehicles
Light truck
and cars
Minicars

1984
1985
1985
1985

Volkswagen
(Germany)
Isuzu (Japan)

1986

Daihatsu
(Japan)
Fiat (Italy)

1988

Isuzu (Japan)

1991

Volkswagen
(Germany)
Toyota (Japan)

Cars
Van
Van
Light
trucks
Van

Import
Cars
production line
1991
Import
Van
technology
Note: Adapted from China Automobile Industry Yearbook 1986, 1993; Automobile
Industry Association Secretariat 2009.

During this period, the major production method for joint ventures in China
was completely knocked down2 (CKD) kit assembly. Most parts were manufactured
2Automobiles are produced in their original country, but disassembled completely into parts
and imported to China, and then Chinese workers reassembled the parts into a finished
vehicle in the plant in China.
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in the foreign country; the plants in China could only assemble the parts under the
supervision of foreign engineers, and only a small number of less significant parts,
such as radios, could be manufactured in China. Nevertheless, new models began to
appear after the joint ventures were started. In September 30, 1986, for example, the
first Xiali, made by CKD method with Daihatsu, rolled out of the plant in China, and
it later became the first family car in China.

4.1.4 Outcomes
Over the course of 10 years, joint ventures boosted the development of
China’s automobile industry so that the gap in technology between China and
industrialized Western countries narrowed: Chinese manufacturers better understood
the modern automobile industry, and joint ventures brought standardization of
management. Before this upgrading, Chinese-made vehicles were mainly ―handfitted,‖ meaning that even the same components in a model were not interchangeable.
This meant, for example, that reaching the German standard of manufacturing was the
result of a long learning curve by SAIC. Carl Hahn, the former chairman of
Volkswagen recalled that, in the middle of the 1980s, Chinese managers and
engineers in the SAIC–VW joint venture had to be trained at German headquarters,
and that the Chinese-made components had to be shipped to Germany to see if they
passed VW’s quality certification (Li, 2008). Because of VW’s high standards, in the
mid-1980s, only 2.7% of components could be produced locally. In 1985, for the
Santana, the flagship model of SAIC–VW, only its wheels and radios were made in
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China. However, after hard-earned learning, the localization rate of Santana
components rose to 82% by 1993 (Liu, 1994).
Foreign investments and the technology learned in joint ventures helped China
to expand its automobile industry significantly during this period. The total number of
automobiles produced in China rose from 149,062 in 1978 to 708,820 in 1991. The
development of China’s economy and automobile market lead to the number of
factories producing vehicles to increase from 57 in 1981 to 120 in 1991, and refitting
factories to increase from 198 in 1981 to 486 in 1991 (see Table 4.2). Joint ventures
clearly allowed the Chinese automobile industry to expand significantly, and the
increased productivity that resulted from these joint ventures reduced the shortage of
automobiles in China.
A significant number of cars were manufactured through these joint ventures.
Table 4.3 shows that, from 1978 to 1991, automobile production increased
dramatically in China. Production of trucks, off-road vehicles, buses and passenger
cars boomed as a result of collaborating with foreign automakers. Trucks remained
major type of vehicle manufactured; the number of buses also increased during this
period. Tables 4.3 and 4.1 together show that the number of automobile factory has
doubled over 14 years, while the number of automobiles produced per year has
increased 7.2 times during the same period. Productivity and capability improved
significantly due to cooperation with foreign firms in joint ventures.
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Table 4.3. Production by Vehicle Type Manufactured in the Chinese Automobile
Industry, 1979 to 1991
Year

No. of Trucks

No. of Off-Road
Vehicles and Buses
1978
96,103
–
1979
11,9501
–
1980
135,532
–
1981
108,261
38,832
1982
121,789
38,000
1983
137,100
34,477
1984
179,846
43,481
1985
236,934
50,282
1986
218,863
46,532
1987
299,356
36,825
1988
364,000
32,325
1989
342,835
41,536
1990
269,098
44,719
1991
452,023
175,442
Note: Adapted from China Automobile Industry Yearbook, 1993.

No. of Cars
2,640
4,152
5,418
3,428
4,030
6,046
6,010
5,207
12,297
20,865
36,798
28,820
42,409
81,055

With China’s transformation from a planned economy to a market economy,
the proportion of planned distribution shrunk. In 1982, 92.3% of automobiles were
distributed by state plan, but this shrank to 22.19% in 1989. Additionally, the market
turned able to set the prices for automobiles instead of the power of the state.

4.1.5 DRMA Summary of Learning Period 1978–1991
A summary of the learning period discussed in this section, using the DRMA
framework, is in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4. DRMA Summary of Learning Period 1978–1991
 Strong political support from the Chinese
Step 1: Political Context

Step 2: Institution Structure

Step 3: Market and Industry
Structures

Step 4: Rent Outcomes

government; no conditional requirements for SOEs
Type of rents:
 Learning rents: heavy trade protection to help
domestic automakers avoiding international
competition and improving capability and upgrading
technology.
 Informal learning rents: based on privileged access to
land, labour, infrastructure, and materials
 Monopoly rents: based on decades of socialism, only
SOEs are automobile manufacturers on the markets
 Allocation of land and capital resources; well-trained,
loyal workers
 Planned economy minimized competition
 Heavy protection: foreign firms can set up factories
in China only as joint ventures
 Growing market and new policies attract foreign
direct investment (FDI)
 Planned economy ensures government the only
distributer of automobiles; SOE–joint ventures do not
worry about marketing
 SOEs become joint ventures
 Chinese engineers train in foreign countries
 Industry successfully upgrades technology and
capability
 Productivity increases significantly in late learning
period

Four factors support the industry and ensure that the rent management is
growth enhancing. In order to industrialize the automobile industry, Chinese leaders
provided a strong and clear political support to reform the economy and develop the
industry. Formal and informal learning rents were provided to firms to ensure
technology acquisition and upgrading through working with foreign automakers in
joint ventures.
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There are failures took place as well when wrong policies were implemented.
Old SOEs were forced to give up self-branded models and focus on the production of
foreign models in joint ventures. Although the technological upgrading and capability
building were successful in the automobile industry, technological diffusion, transfer
and research and development of core technology were limited or prohibited by
foreign firms. Government in developing countries should pay more attention to
technology transfer when negotiating with foreign firms.

4.2 Developing Period (1992–2000)
4.2.1 Political Context of the Chinese Automobile Industry
After a decade of cooperation with foreign enterprises in joint ventures, the
Chinese government started to pass policies that supported China’s automobile
industry. During a meeting of the national automobile industry in 1992, two vice
prime ministers of China, Rongji Zhu and Jiahua Zou, suggested that having too
many automobile component factories with limited production capabilities restricted
development of the entire industry. They determined that it was important to reduce
the number of factories, expand production, improve both the quality and quantity of
component products, and relocate component factories closer to the manufacturers to
lower costs and increase profits (China Automobile Industry Yearbook, 1993). The
State Council published Strengthen Aggregate Management (Including Motorcycle)
in Automobile Industry of the Interim Measures, an order designed to reinforce
announcements from these two vice prime ministers.
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With the progress of China’s reform, government loses control on most
aspects of its economy. Although automobile industry is controlled by the State
Council, the State Council changed its role from a hands-on player to a guide guiding
the industry development by implementing policies that were based on information
collected from both international and domestic sources (Xu, 2003). Automakers are
approved by the State Council to make decisions by themselves.

4.2.2 Institution
State Council Decree 82 (1988), State Council Notification to Control the
Number of Car Manufacturers, prohibited the issuance of new licenses or building
new car production plants and stopped projects without State Council approval.
Conflicting with local government interests and the national development goal, the
decree was not favored by local government, the implementation of which had thus
been slow down. This influenced the boom of, and reestablished entry barriers into,
the automobile industry. Although this decree was published in 1988, it largely
affected the automobile industry in the developing period. Two Chinese automobile
companies, Alto and Yunque were established—both under the military system—
regardless of the decree.
With State Council Decree 17 (1994), the Policy of Automobile Industry,
passed in 1994, the government, for the first time, encouraged private families to own
cars. It thus aimed to make the automobile industry a pillar of the Chinese economy.
As noted earlier, the government policy stated that manufacturers could set the prices
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for their own for civilian cars, as long as the change in price was within 10% above or
below of the price set by the Department of Price. To expand the automobile market
and to satisfy the increasing demand for vehicles, the State Planning Commission
encouraged automobile factories to operate their own retail networks; thus, a new
system was brought to the automobile market.
Decree 17 also encouraged automobile manufacturers to seek investments
from domestic and/or overseas automobile companies. One goal of this decree was to
reduce the number of Chinese factories while having the remaining factories improve
their productivity and quality of their products. Also under Decree 17, privately
owned Chinese automobile corporations were finally allowed to conduct R&D.
Clearly, the purpose and capacity of the automobile industry changed radically over
time, from filling state demand for a limited audience to developing into a modern
industry. With its R&D institutions, privately owned Chinese automobile businesses
created their own models with their own technologies. Nevertheless, these new
models had to earn a certain proportion of the market to get state support; but if a
factory reached this proportion, it would benefit in seven ways:


Its fixed asset investments would become tax-free.



It would receive priority of floatation of shares to enter the stock
market.



It would receive priority for faster bank loans with lower interest rates.



It would also receive priority to get FDI.
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Its plan to expand its economy-car production would receive policybased lending.



Its financial department could broaden business, with permission from
a related government agency.



Its R&D projects would receive financial assistance from the state.

China started reducing its tariff on imported automobiles in 1994. Tariff for
automobiles with displacement smaller than 3.0 liters was reduced to 110%, and that
for cars with displacement larger than 3.0 liters was reduced to 150% (China
Automobile Consumer Network, 2006). In 1997, tariff was reduced to 80% and 100%
respectively for imported cars with displacement smaller than 3.0 liters and larger
than 3.0 liters (China Automobile Consumer Network, 2006). However, the
percentage of imported vehicles has shrunk from 16.5% in 1992 to 3% in 2001. With
the development of China’s automobile industry and economy, customers prefer
domestically-manufactured automobiles because of lower price and relatively high
quality. Although tariff has been reduced, it provides protection for China’s
developing industry.

4.2.3 Structure of Industry
As the market economy system began to function in China, privatization of
SOEs largely took place in all sectors. Private businesses became the most active
element in the market, for they brought fierce competition to the market for both
private enterprises and SOEs (Li, 1992). Competition has also been intense in the
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automobile industry, even for newly-emerged private automobile manufacturers. Joint
ventures forced those private ones to improve their capabilities (Hsia, 2006).
However, joint ventures and private firms went on the different paths to their own
success.

4.2.3.1 Joint Ventures.
As noted above, the Chinese automobile industry required economies of
scale, which is why the Policy of Automobile Industry (1994) supported SOE–foreign
company joint ventures. In order to increase passenger car production, the
government chose eight joint ventures. Of these eight, three large were (FAW
Volkswagen, Second Motor Works [Dongfeng Peugeot-Citroen], and SAIC
Volkswagen), three were medium (Beijing Jeep, Tianjin Micro, and Guangzhou
Peugeot), and two were micro (Chang-An Machinery and Guizhou Aerospace, both
under the military). With existing economies of scale, these joint ventures reached the
standard set in Decree 17. Some well-run local SOEs also benefited from the policy.
Conversely, SOEs with poor management washed out of the market, making
the industry stronger. Military-owned automobile enterprises were also hurt when, on
July 22, 1998, the Central Military Commission, under President Zemin Jiang,
ordered the People’s Liberation Army to withdraw from all commercial businesses,
which turned them into civilian-run enterprises. These new enterprises, of course, had
no military privileges. This 1998 order undid the order of May 4, 1985, when the
State Council and Central Military Commission approved the PLA’s request to
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engage in commercial activities. The 1985 order allowed the military to make money
to cover their financial shortages. However, the military turned into a giant economic
system engaged in all kinds of economic activities, including mass smuggling. The
income tax rate for nonmilitary firms was 33%, but the rate for military-owned firms
was only 9.9%. Military-owned firms also had licensing privileges and increased
scopes of business. Within one decade of approving military-run operations, the State
Council and Central Military Commission realized the military needed to withdraw
from commercial activities (Cao, 1999). However, those former military owned
enterprises still favored from their former ownership in accessing financial and other
resources.
This 1994 development policy encouraged the remaining manufacturers to
develop in producing their products into series and improve their production
techniques to a more professional level. With increased sales from the market
economy—and with financial assistance from Western companies to encourage R&D
projects—operational financial support by government agencies was removed. SOEs
now had to bear their own financial losses even as they benefitted from the joint
ventures, such as gaining the opportunities to get national investments and bank loans
and to enter the stock market (He, 2010). Additionally, market competition forced the
remaining automobile enterprises to develop in a modern direction through rapid
increases in productivity and capacity. Truck production eventually slowed down
through the end of the Cold War, given there was no need to produce trucks for
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military use. Meanwhile, with the rapid expansion of the economy, as well as through
Decree 17, there was an increase in the demand for buses and cars.
As noted above, Decree 17 also encouraged automobile enterprises to
establish two types of retail networks: dealerships and commission agents (Liu, 2006).
Dealerships purchased automobiles using their own money (and bearing higher
financial risks), while commission agents worked as middlemen, selling automobiles
on commission (bearing lower risks). According to Fourin, a Japanese auto magazine,
retail networks sold 60% to 70% of cars; state-owned and locally owned automobile
companies sold 20% of cars; and military-backed trading enterprises sold 10% of cars
(Hsia, 2006).
SOE–joint ventures, through their higher productivity and capacity, generated
much higher profits for Chinese-based manufacturers. However, a major failure in
rent management was that SOEs, unlike privately owned manufacturers, were not
allowed to develop their own core technologies under their own copyright; instead,
the R&D departments of foreign partners stayed in their own countries. Actually, one
of the most common terms to establish a joint venture was that a Chinese
manufacturer would not pursue its own R&D. SOEs suffered from lack of technology
transfers and diffusion because their foreign partners did not allow Chinese engineers
to transfer foreign technologies to China’s own brands (Jia, 2011). Instead, foreign
partners allowed their technology only to be localized by providing production
permits (Li, 2012). All products in a joint venture had to be approved by the foreign
party, which made it impossible for the Chinese manufacturer to improve its Chinese56

made products. Foreign parties were also in charge of providing new products and
prohibited their Chinese partners from creatively modifying any car in order to avoid
conflicts of interest (Zhu, 1996). SOE–joint ventures, thus, turned out to be much
more like an overseas assembly line for foreign enterprises.

4.2.3.2 Privately Owned Automobile Enterprises
Unlike SOE–joint ventures, privately owned Chinese automobile enterprises
were allowed to develop technologies, so they organized their own R&D departments.
Nevertheless, this period was challenging for them, too. Geely Auto’s history, for
example, is telling. Geely—eventually one of the most successful privately owned
automobile enterprises in China—was founded as a refrigerator manufacturer in 1986,
but it wanted to enter the automobile market. Although the 1994 policy encouraged
civilian families to buy vehicles, the state still tightly held licenses for manufacturing
entrants to the industry. Geely gained its automobile-manufacturing license by
purchasing a bankrupt local SOE in 1997. Geely’s first mass-produced car was a copy
of the Xiali, a model made by Tianjin Motors and originally imported from Daihatsu
in Japan. Geely’s engines were purchased from the joint venture FAW–Toyota,
although the joint venture both increased the price of its engines for Geely and
cancelled its engine warranty. There was nothing Geely could do against this giant
joint venture, so it decided to invent its own engines, first by copying these engines.
Private enterprises such as Geely were forced to start their own R&D departments in
order to combat the SOEs’ monopolistic powers (Che, 2016).
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4.2.4 Rent Outcomes
Because of State Council Decree 82 (1988), the number of automobile
factories was slightly decreased in the developing period, even as refitted factories
increased, as seen in Table 4.5. As noted above, though, the smaller number of
manufacturers improved their scales of economy and capabilities in production and
operation. The automobile industry expanded largely during the developing period,
despite that the number of automobile manufacturers slightly decreased. One decade
of cooperation with foreign enterprises helped China establish a solid foundation for
the modern automobile industry, which ensured rapid development in the developing
period. By comparing Tables 4.5with 4.6, it can be found out that within the industry,
the number of automobile manufacturers has slightly decreased, but the capability and
productivity have increased significantly.

Table 4.5. Number of Manufacturers in Chinese Automobile Industry, 1992–2000
Year
Automobile Manufacturers
Refitting Factories
1992
124
479
1993
124
552
1994
122
536
1995
122
516
1996
122
520
1997
119
540
1998
119
521
1999
118
546
2000
118
542
Note: Based on China Automobile Industry Yearbook, 2001.
Table 4.6 shows that, through the developing period, manufacturing capability
increased from 106 thousand automobiles in 1992 to 2.06 million in 2000. This
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means that only after eight years, capability had increased 20 times. Competition led
to new models, and price wars led to more affordable cars. As noted above, this also
led the industry to move away from manufacturing commercial trucks and toward
passenger cars. Although trucks were still the major products in the industry, the
demands for passenger car and bus have increased dramatically. Passenger car also
changed from a symbol of political power to consumer goods, except for some luxury
ones.

Table 4.6. Number of Vehicles, Manufactured by Type, 1992 to 2000
Year
Truck
Bus
Car
1992
626,414
272,582
162,725
1993
774,868
292,213
229,697
1994
785,876
317,159
250,333
1995
721,822
405,454
325,461
1996
688,614
395,192
391,099
1997
659,318
435,615
487,695
1998
661,701
459,025
507,103
1999
756,312
509,179
566,105
2000
751,699
709,042
607,445
Note: Based on China Automobile Industry Yearbook, 2004.

Total
106,1721
129,6778
1,353,368
1,452,697
1,474,905
1,582,628
1,629,182
1,830,323
2,068,168

Before China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), more new models
entered the Chinese market—and not only localized models of foreign brands—and
competition increased. Although the Price Department originally stated that cars, sold
after distribution quotas were met, could float only +/- 10% of MSRP (Manufacturer
Suggested Retail Price), a price war was declared by the joint ventures in 1998. The
highest point of this war occurred in 2000, the year before China joined the WTO.
Dongfeng–Peugeot-Citreon reduced the price of its Citreon Fukang by 9.7% of MSRP,
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and the formerly military-owned Chang-An Machinery reduced the price for its Alto
by almost 18% of MSRP. Table 4.7 shows the price change of vehicles in the year
2000, in which the fiercest price war in China’s automobile market took place. It also
provides evidence that competition forces automakers to lower the price in spite of
government’s regulation on MSRP.
Table 4.7. Price Changes of Major Popular Vehicles During Price War, 2000.

Price in
Jan. 2000
Price in
Dec. 2000
Percentage
Reduced

SAIC-VW
Volkswagen

FAW-VW
Jetta

BeijingJeep
BJ2020
￥6,850

FAWRed Flag

ChangAn Alto

￥13,150

DongfengCitreonFukang
￥11,960

￥12,150

￥19,800

￥6,080

￥12,000

￥12,350

￥10,800

￥6,600

￥18,800

￥4,990

1.23

6.1

9.7

3.65

5.05

17.93

Note: Adapted from Hsia (2006, p. 25). ￥is the unit of RMB.
An online survey on automobile ownership, which collected 3,268 responses
from across 32 provinces—and which was subsequently reported on eight major
national websites and across seven major mainstream media services—showed that,
of the sample collected, 15.7% already privately owned an automobile; 92.5% wanted
to purchase a car; and 67.9% wanted to buy one within five years (Beijing Asian
Games Village Automobile Market, 2000). Automobiles became a more traditional
consumption good rather than a luxury item or symbol of political power, as in
China’s recent past. The number of privately owned vehicles increased significantly
from 1996 to 2000. According to the Year Book 2001, the number of privately owned
trucks and cars doubled in this period: in 1996 there were 2,896,738 privately owned
trucks and cars, which increased to 6,233,304 in 2000. The structure of demand in the
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market also changed significantly. In 1996, the market was split evenly between cars
and trucks. However, the number of privately owned cars increased 250% in five
years, while trucks increased 80%. Thus, with the development of the Chinese
economy, passenger cars became a priority for the industry: cars increased the living
standard, while trucks simple made profits.
R&D in the automobile industry took two separate routes, one by the SOE–
joint ventures and the other by privately owned automobile enterprises. As noted
earlier, joint ventures made localized products for their foreign partners, so they
focused on localization of technology (Zhu, 1996). Privately owned enterprises,
however, were forced—or encouraged—to invent their own new models with core
technologies under their own copyrights.

4.2.5 DRMA Summary of Developing Period (1992–2000)
A summary of the developing period discussed in this section, using the
DRMA framework, is in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8. DRMA Summary of Developing Period 1992–2000
Step 1: Political Context
 Political support from the state to increase scales of
economy in the industry; stops issuing new licenses
to newcomers
Type of rents:
 Monopoly rents: based on: prevents newcomers and
encourages scales of economy
 Redistributive rents: based on military establishing
new factories, regardless of State Council Decree 82
(1988)
 Schumpeterian rents: based on tax breaks and
priority to access finance, FDI, and grants after
enterprise meets standards of innovation
Step
2:
Institution  Stops issuing new licenses to increase scales of
Structure
economy
 State encourages innovation
 Moves toward market economy to prepare for WTO
Step 3: Market and
 Increase competition among SOEs and joint ventures
Industry Structures
 Government and military remove support from their
enterprises
 Market economy appears
 R&D in joint ventures limited to localization
 Private-owned enterprises appear but struggle under
both industrial policy sectors and SOE–joint ventures
Step 4: Rent Outcomes
 Production of automobiles doubles in eight years
with slightly decreased number of manufacturers,
due to industry’s upgrading in technology and
capability
 Increasing competition as a result of price war
 SOE–joint ventures and private enterprises have
different paths to R&D

After decades of cooperating with foreign firms, Chinese government gains a
better understanding of how to support the automobile industry, how regulations
would help develop it, and how a free market could improve the capability of SOEbacked joint ventures. Increasing economic scale efficiently improves the
productivity and capability, but high entry barriers prevent new comers to the industry,
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especially the private firms, or even new SOEs. Joint venture helped China’s
automobile industry develop quickly in both productivity and capability, but failure of
technology transfer and diffusion in joint ventures hurt those SOEs and lead to the
trap of foreign direct investment.

4.3 Chinese-Owned Automobile Enterprises in Post-WTO Period (2001–2014)
4.3.1 Political Context
China joined the WTO in 2001, which brought both challenges and
opportunities to the automobile industry. Joining the WTO had been a milestone of
the Reform and Opening Up policy. Up until 2001, the Chinese automobile industry
had developed through foreign technology and capital, but that development was
protected by high tariffs and other nontax protections (He, 2006). Joining the WTO
meant that these supports and protections would have to be removed. The U.S.–China
Bilateral WTO Agreement, for example, included six major terms that would affect
the Chinese automobile industry: (1) tariffs on automobiles would be lowered from
current 80% or 100% by 2001, and then to 25% by 2006; (2) tariffs on auto parts
would be cut to 10% by 2006; (3) all quotas and quantity limitations would be
removed by 2005; (4) foreign enterprises could engage in international trade without
Chinese trading enterprises as middlemen; (5) foreign enterprises would be permitted
to set up their own retail and customer services in China; and (6) the regulations to
limit production of types and models of vehicles would be removed within two years
after joining WTO (―U.S.–China Bilateral WTO Agreement‖). Simply stated, joining
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the WTO lowered tariffs, opened the market, and removed government protections
and assistance for the domestic automobile industry. The time horizon to implement
these terms provides learning rents so that China’s domestic firms (especially for new
SOEs and private firms) have time for technological upgrading, as technological
upgrading requires time and government protection.
The tenth five-year plan (2001—2005) encouraged families to purchase
automobiles, which was the first time that the state officially supported private
automobile ownership. This encouragement from the state caused the automobile
market to grow significantly. Many private owned and government-owned
automobile enterprises were founded during this period, and they grew significantly;
they sold their cars at much lower prices to take lower price market was leftover from
the SOE–joint ventures. These smaller enterprises succeeded even without support
from the Chinese government. Until 2004, the policies of the Automobile Industry
Development focused on economies of scale, not on developing products and brands.

4.3.2 Institutions
In 2004, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
published NDRC Decree 8 (2004), an automobile industry development policy
(―Chinese Automobile,‖ 2004). This decree created Schumpeterian rent that
encouraged automobile enterprises to cooperate with each other to improve R&D to
more professional levels, increase economies of scale, and invent their own core
technologies. Additionally, this decree included goals for emission reduction and
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development of new-energy vehicles, such as electric cars, hybrid cars, and so on. To
move the automobile industry toward a higher level of productivity, entry barriers
were raised once again. With its significant fixed costs and economies of scale to
build new plants and support R&D, the minimum up-front investment to apply for a
license to enter the automobile industry was at least 2 billion RMB. With this decree,
licenses that would bankrupt an automobile enterprise were cancelled, and enterprises
were prohibited from buying a bankrupt licensed manufacturer in order to gain a
license. The entry barrier rose again for the new comers and also created monopoly
rent for existing automobile enterprises.
To help private individuals purchase automobiles, as encouraged under the
tenth five-year plan, the NDRC Decree 8 supported banks to provide auto loans to
these individuals. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) published
CBRC Decree 2 in 2004, which provided guidelines for auto loans, including the
basic requirements for a private person to apply for a loan. These requirements
lowered proof to basic personal information, income, and sufficient property to act as
collateral (―Regulations of auto loan management,‖ 2004). The applicant also needed
to have a good credit history, although the Chinese personal credit information system
started its operation only in January 2006 (Credit Reference Center, n.d.).

4.3.3 The structures of two corporations
When SOEs joined into joint ventures, they had to give up producing their
own models, even if some so-called innovative models were simply redesigned
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bodies with imported chassis and engines. For example, Hongqi, a luxury-class sedan
from FAW, was first made with a chassis and engine from Audi and Chrysler; a later
version was a copy of the Crown from Toyota (Wu, 2012). From 2001 to 2014,
privately owned and new SOE automobile enterprises started to develop their own
models. For this case study, two specific companies, one state-owned and one
privately owned, are discussed next.
4.3.3.1 The Chery Company
The Chery Company was a state-owned automobile corporation established in
1997 by the Anhui provincial government. Five local investment corporations in
Anhui province provided the up-front investment of 1.75 billion RMB; the Anhui
provincial government managed this company. With Decree 17, discussed above, the
State Council stopped issuing new automobile production licenses. Until 2001, the
Chery Company could only sell their cars within the Anhui province, with support
from the local government (Phoenix Auto Channel, 2009). To help the unlicensed
Chery remain on the market, the government of Wuhu City forced the local taxi
companies to purchase the first batch of Chery cars (Luo, 2005). In order to enter the
market outside Anhui province, Chery gave away 20% of its shares to SAIC in
exchange for use of SAIC’s license to sell Chery vehicles on the national market
(Sohu Business Channel, 2003).
Additionally, to attract engineers and experts to produce its Chinese-designed
cars, Chery used its provincial government’s political and financial clout: ―Chery
headhunted 30 overseas experts with broad experience in global corporations such as
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GM and Ford‖ (Li, 2009). These experts brought their knowledge to Chery and
trained Chery’s young engineers. Table 4.9 details the professionals hired.

Table 4.9. List of Experts at Chery
Name
Xu, M.

Xin, J.

Gu, L.

Post
Experience
Overseas Chinese Experts (approx. 30 people)
Director of Automobile Engineering,
Ph.D., Engineering, Hiroshima
Institute of CHERY, Chief Leader of
University; worked for GM, Ford,
R&D
Visteon; engine expert

Vice Director of Automobile
Engineering Institute of CHERY,
Leader of Engine Durability & Hybrid
Car
Vice Director of Automobile
Engineering Institute of CHERY,
Leader of Digital Crash Test

Yuan, T.

Vice President, Parts Procurement

Qi, G. J.

Vice Director of Automobile
Engineering Institute of CHERY,
Leader of Automobile Body-In-White
(stage in auto manufacturing)
Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer
Chassis Research
Electronic Driving Research
Transmission Research

Sun, G. C.
Yuan, Y. B.
Li, M.
Zhu, X. C.
Gu, Y.

Kang, L. M.
Hu, F.

Feng, J. Q.

Terada, S.

Vice President of CHERY
Subsidiaries; Die & Mold

Worked for Honda (United States).

Ph.D., Modern Mechanics,
University of Science and
Technology, Beijing; Northwest
University; worked for Ford; crash
test expert
Ph.D., Engine, Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique; studied at
Beijing University of Aeronautics
and Astronautics.
Worked for DaimlerChrysler AG

Chief Financial Officer, DuPont
(China)
Worked for TRW Automobile
Worked for Motorola
Chery, Australia; returned to Chery,
China.
Worked for Fuji (Japan)

Chinese Experts from FAW (approx. 150 people)
Chief Engineer, Engine Project
FAW
Manager
Vice Chief Engineer, Project Leader of
Graduated from Automobile
Engine Co-project with AVL
Engineering, Tsinghua University;
FAW; retired from DongFeng
Motors (1995)
Vice Chief Engineer, Designer of
First engine designer of New China;
CAC372 engine for QQ0.8L
designed the 6102 gasoline engine
for JieFang 141 Truck
Foreign Experts (approx. 40 people)
Plant Manager, Operation
Mitsubishi Motors, Plant Manager
Management
(30 years)
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Kawano, K.
Kim, U. S.
German Expert

Director of Plant KAIZEN
Mazda Motors (40 years)
Vice Chief Engineer
Ricardo Company
Manufacturing Technology Support
Unknown
Other Domestic Engineers (Unknown number)
Lu, J. H.
Vice President, R&D
Graduate, Automobile
Manufacturing, Tsinghua University
Li, F.
Vice President, Sales
Vice President, Foton Motors Sales
Co.
Note. See Z. Li 2008, pp. 103–115. In 2006, Chery had 18,000 employees, including nearly 4,000 engineers; 1,500
were directly involved in R&D.

Chery headhunted its first group of R&D engineers from Dongfeng Motor.
These engineers could no longer conduct R&D research at Dongfeng after it became
a joint venture with Nissan. As a reminder, an SOE in a joint venture could not pursue
its own R&D. These Dongfeng engineers had already worked together for a long time,
so they could quickly set up and operated the R&D department at Chery. The two
most significant benefits were that (1) these engineers had overseen the modification
and localization for Dongfeng-Citroen, and (2) Citroen in France had trained some of
these engineers (Lu, 2005). These engineers were worried that Chery might become
another Dongfeng, since they were both government-owned enterprises. However,
Chery provided 2/3 shares as financial support, and these engineers provided human
capital as the other 1/3 share to start a new automobile design and development
company: Jia Jing Technology Company (Luo, 2005). Chery outsourced its R&D
projects to the independent-operated Jia Jing Technology, which was the first step in
Chery’s strategy to develop its own R&D. Chery’s goal was to develop new products
with foreign automobile and engine design companies, and thus train its engineers
through this project (Guo, 2005). The second goal was to then independently design
low-end models to advance Chery’s capability of developing a new car development
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process. The final goal was to establish R&D for full line of passenger cars in all
price and size ranges, from sedan to SUVs (Luo, 2005).
4.3.3.2 The Geely Company
The Geely Company was the most successful privately owned automobile
corporation in China. It was established in 1986 as a privately owned refrigerator
maker, with money borrowed from the owner’s family (Chen, 2012). Geely’s ability
to sell inexpensive products to Chinese consumers gave it the financial backing in
1997 to purchase a bankrupt licensed automobile factory so it could enter the
automobile market (Che, 2016). Because it was privately owned, Geely had no
political or financial support from the state. The economic and political environments
were much tougher for a private enterprise in China, and remain so even today.
Running into issues with FAW-Toyota, first when it increased the price of its engines
and then when it decreased its engine supply, Geely decided to start its own R&D
department by copying the Toyota engine purchased from FAW-Toyota (―Firstbranded,‖ 2006).
Geely understood that independent innovation would be the key to its success
when it entered the automobile market, and that lower innovation costs would be
needed. With its lack of financial support, technology, and human resources, Geely
decided to offer less expensive automobiles (Che, 2016). By copying existing models,
especially engines and transmissions, Geely could avoid the risk of using component
supplies from SOEs. When Geely built its plant, it purchased advanced technology to
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improve the quality of its model, Ziyou Jian (Ma, 2007). With its great quality control
processes, Geely was able to enter the higher-end passenger car market.
To create its core technologies, Geely established four colleges in China:
Beijing Geely University, Sanya University, Zhejiang Automobile Engineering
Institute, and Hunan Geely Automobile Technical College (Geely, n.d.a.). At the
Zhejiang Automobile Engineering Institute, 166 professors taught graduate students
who would eventually work for Geely (Geely, n.d.d.).

4.3.4 Outcomes
After joining the WTO, Chinese automobile production increased from 2.334
million in 2001 to 23.5 million in 2014; and, since 2009, China has ranked as the
country with the highest number of automobiles manufactured. As happened with
Chery and Geely, private owned and new state-owned automobile manufacturers
became the most active enterprises in the Chinese automobile market. Additionally,
over time, an increased number of newly Chinese-designed auto models entered the
market, which began in the early stages of China’s R&D period with the reverse
engineering of foreign cars. Lower prices helped private firms survive under the
pressure of giant SOE–joint ventures, and producing in-house designed models made
them successful in the marketplace. Figure 4.1 shows the number of cars
manufactured in China between 2001 and 2014. It demonstrates growing capability of
China’s automobile industry after joining the WTO. The production capability of
China’s automobile industry rose 10 times during this period and thus made China the
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country with the highest number of automobiles manufactured in the world since
2009.

Figure 4.1. Number of Automobile Manufactured, 2001 to 2014, in ten thousand

Number of Automobiles Manufactured
Number of Automobile Manufactured
2349.19
2211.68
1927.18
1806 1841.89
1364

233.4

325

444

507

572

728

888

938
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Note. Based on China Automobile Industry Yearbook, 2013, 2015.
Since 2001, price competition is the norm among China’s automobile makers.
With the increasing prices of iron and rubber in the global market, Chinese
automobile manufacturers began to purchase materials and components from all over
the world. Additionally, 3S (sale, spare parts, and service) and 4S (sale, spare parts,
service, and survey) dealerships became retailers, replacing certain government
departments (such as Machinery Department in different administrative levels) that
used to distribute automobiles (Hsia, 2006).
The Chinese automobile industry developed rapidly between 2001 and 2014,
with 60 brands of automobiles produced and registered in China, including new
Chinese brands through SOE–joint ventures (Sina.com, 2016); both private owned
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and new SOE enterprises played significant roles in both the domestic and
international markets.
Chery cooperated with Iran’s SKT to build a Chery assembly line in Iran to
produce automobiles by the CKD method. Chery provided the components and
design and also helped to build the Iranian retail network (Sina Auto Channel, 2003).
In 2007, Chery established another joint venture in Iran with Iran Khodro, and
authorized it to build Chery cars with the CKD method (China Net, 2007). In that
year, Chery produced its one-millionth car in China—having produced its first car in
December 1999 (Chery, n.d.a.). In 2014, Chery built its largest overseas plant in
Brazil (Phoenix Auto Channel, 2014). Chery also recently started to produce electric
vehicles (Chery, n.d.b.).
Geely, the most successful Chinese private automobile enterprise, also
exported its products to the international market; for example, it exported one of its
assembly lines to the Ukraine, producing its Ziyoujian model through the semiknocked down method (Sina Auto Channel, 2007). Geely bought Volvo Cars by
purchasing 100% of its shares in 2010 (Phoenix Auto, 2010). In 2012, it signed an
agreement with Egypt’s GB Auto to assemble Geely’s Dihao EC7 model and to build
a retail network in Egypt (Zhou, 2012). In 2012, Geely exported its products to Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and other Middle Eastern countries; and it built an
assembly line in Iraq to produce cars with the CKD method (Geely, n.d.c.) Geely has
been one of the world’s top 500 enterprises since 2012.

72

4.3.5 Summary of Chinese Owned Enterprises (2001–2014)
A summary of automobile manufacturing in China, using the DRMA
framework, is in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10. DRMA Summary of Chinese Owned Enterprises 2001–2014
Step 1: Political Context
 WTO brings pressure to the market
 Government removes protections with a time

Step 2: Institution Structure

Step 3: Market and Industry Structures

Step 4: Rent Outcomes

horizon, due to the WTO regulations
 Rapid growth in economy and automobile market
results in more automobile newcomers
 Government supports R&D core technology
Type of rents:
 Learning rents: based on time horizon to remove
protections, helps learning in technological
upgrading in private owned and new SOEs;
protection and support for new SOEs at
administrative level to which they belong
 Schumpeterian rents: created by government,
encourages core technology innovation
 Monopoly rents: raises entry barrier
 Sets initial minimum required up-front costs for new
manufacturers to gain license
 Encourages R&D for core technology
 Effective institutional arrangement and management
of rent to support industry development
 Establishes market economy
 New SOEs still have limited protection from the
administrative level to which they belong
 Professional engineers and managers hired at
privately owned and new SOE car manufacturers
 Market incentives for lower-priced cars
 Pressure from joint ventures as suppliers force
privately owned and new SOE car manufacturers to
innovate core technology
 Private and new SOEs become most active players
on the market
 Became the world’s largest automobile
manufacturing country
 Successfully exports technology to foreign countries
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After joining the WTO, market economy and both international and domestic
competition have forced China’s automobile industry to develop faster. Private and
new SOEs become the most active players in the industry by having their own core
technologies and active business strategies. Policies during this period successfully
helped automobile industry become strong and developed, but they still neglect the
fact that the private enterprises need support from the state.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

This thesis presents the developmental process of the modern Chinese
automobile industry in three case studies. By analyzing development of the
automobile industry in three consecutive periods, several decisive factors that
significantly affected development of the industry were identified: technology
upgrading, its diffusion, and its capability building in terms of rents.
Empirical case studies provide evidence that properly managed rents can be
value enhancing and developmental. However, a rent management system has to
focus on the current political and economic conditions in a specific country, with its
own unique path to industrial growth. During the learning period (1978–1991) in
China, strong political desire to develop the industry, existing economic scale of stateowned enterprises (SOEs), and efficient resource allocation resulted in state-backed
ownership and lack of regulations, even though the total volume of the economy
ensured fundamental development of the industry. In the period of development
(1992–2000), valuable cooperation with foreign firms enabled the government to
have a better understanding of how to support the automobile industry, how
regulations could develop it, and how a free market could improve the capability of
large SOE–joint ventures. Simultaneously, failures of technology transfer and
diffusion in joint ventures hurt these SOEs, and led to the trap of foreign direct
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investment (FDI). Nevertheless, rapid economic development helped build the
industry, and private-owned and newer SOE automobile factories appeared on the
market. During the post-World Trade Organization period (2001–2014), SOE–joint
ventures, new SOEs, and private-owned automobile enterprises developed along
different paths: diverse strategies made all types of enterprises successful in their
unique way in the market.
Analytically, these case studies help improve the understanding of how
different rent management mechanisms affected the structures of the industry. The
state provided incentives and pressures for firms with different ownership types and
further drive these firms to adopt technological learning, to upgrade, and to find
strategies of innovation in other developing countries. This configuration of factors
helps to explain the successes and failures in developing China’s automobile industry.
The analytical framework is based on the developmental rent management analysis,
which focuses on different configurations of factors in three directions: (1) the
political context at different times, which results in particular combinations of formal
and informal rent outcomes; (2) the structure of formal and informal policies, which
supports different types of rent; and (3) market structures and types of ownerships,
which affect various strategies and rent opportunities.
Multiple factors supported the industry and ensured that rent management was
growth enhancing in China. First, top Chinese leaders provided strong and clear
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political support to reform the economy and develop the industry. Second, formal 3
and informal4 learning rents provided to firms ensured technology acquisition and
upgrading. Third, the state allowed limited domestic competition to ensure SOE–joint
ventures grew in their infant periods. Fourth, the state provided protection against
international competition, even after joining the World Trade Organization. Fifth,
timely policies ensured proper management of industrial developmental goals,
development of the economy, and international relationships. These factors together
provided an effective rent management mechanism for the Chinese automobile
industry to promote industrialization and development. Some institutional failures
were identified in the case studies, but overall the outcomes were industrial and
economic growth.
During the learning period (1978–1991), older SOEs were forced to give up
self-branded models and had to focus on the production of foreign models in their
joint ventures. During this period, the state government did not negotiate with foreign
firms for technological diffusion or R&D departments to gain core technology.
Nevertheless, with top leaders’ political support, with SOEs’ existing capacity for
learning, with a large demand for automobiles, and with heavy protectionism in the
domestic market, technological upgrading and capacity building in the automobile
industry was ensured.

3Formal learning rent is intentionally created by policy makers to help rent receivers on technological
adoption.

4Informal learning rent is created unintentionally or comes from unexpected learning outcomes.
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In the developing period (1992–2000), SOEs in joint ventures had limited
R&D and technological diffusion because of their foreign partners, and private
enterprises ran into licensing regulations and limited state policy support; made
private enterprises hardly to enter the industry and lack of policy support to private
firms. However, strong political support from the Chinese state government; large
demand for automobiles; and the protected domestic market; additionally, flexible
management strategies of private firms; active market competition, and pressures
from SOE–joint ventures forced R&D in private firms ensured their growth and
overall development and technological upgrading.
Nonetheless, the case studies also suggest that some of rent management
factors resulted in growth reduction. Historical monopoly rent favored SOEs in the
learning period (1978–1991) and the developing period (1992–2000); this gave them
priority in accessing foreign direct investment, which was used to create the SOE–
joint ventures. Redistributive rents helped military-backed firms enter the industry,
even though the State Council had stopped issuing new licenses. These militarybacked firms were favored in tax collection and resource allocation, and these firms
continued to benefit even after the Central Military Commission withdrew military
ownership.
The development of China’s automobile industry can provide many lessons
for other developing countries. First, attracting FDI and creating joint ventures with
foreign companies initially boosted China’s automobile processes and economies of
scale. However, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were trapped into either importing or
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localizing foreign technologies, not developing their own technologies. This meant
that the SOEs became little more than low-value-added assembly lines. Therefore,
joint ventures helped to develop China’s automobile industry only for a short time.
Conversely, with limited access to state resources, new SOEs and private-owned
firms in China were forced to create their own R&D departments to innovate
technologies. Although they had a slower start and higher uphill climb, these firms
became the more successful players in the domestic marketplace, and they even
moved into the international market. The case of FDI in joint ventures provides
evidence that supports the literature review in Chapter 2. Technology transfers are
never voluntary and automatic; instead, most significant innovations and research and
development activities stay in the mother countries of foreign partners.
The Chinese automobile industry also provides several lessons for Chinese
leaders. First, before they write policy, they need to analyze both domestic and
international conditions, such as levels of technology, overall financial and human
resources, and needed natural resources. Second, as Rodrik (2004) suggests, rent
management strategies have to focus on the political and economic contexts of a
specific country. Third, understanding the gap between domestic and advanced
foreign enterprises, and the advantages and disadvantages of each, is vital. Fourth,
policymakers need to consider both short-term and long-term developmental goals;
and they need to schedule a timeline for meeting these goals, providing both incentive
and punitive measures associated with that timeline. As Khan and Jomo (2000) noted,
a state needs to accept if a firm or industry is not developing along the given time
79

horizon, and needs to use punitive measures, including cutting subsidies and adding
tariffs. Conversely, once a firm or industry goal is achieved, the state should then
slowly remove the benefits so that local firms stop depending on state resources. Fifth,
as Stiglitz (2016) and Chang (1999) argued, the state needs to properly manage
economic problems through a variety of institutional arrangements to ensure
sustainable development of the industry. Finally, although FDI can rapidly grow an
industry in its infancy, there is little to no technology diffusion to domestic firms.
Therefore, policies should include expectations related to technology diffusion,
including setting quantitative measurements.
This final point is reflected in Amsden (2009), Ngo (2007), and Hoekman
(2004), who all acknowledge that adaptation of new technology from a developed
country will enhance the capability and develop the industry in a developing country.
Stiglitz (2016) adds that properly managed technology policies can make a country
more competitive. Chinese SOEs suffered from not being able to develop their own
technology. Chinese policymakers could have learned a valuable lesson from the
Singapore government, which used highly interventionist policies to promote and
deepen its industries and to upgrade its industrial structure. An Economic
Development Board was created in the 1960s to manage industrial policies and FDI.
Singapore not only provided grants to foreign firms but also had strategies to induce
transnational corporations to establish R&D sectors. Finally, if a firm failed to follow
set developmental strategies, the Singapore government removed its support.
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Chinese policymakers need to provide opportunities for local firms, not just
state-run enterprises. Failure to develop local firms will hollow out the industry,
which is what occurred in Hong Kong. Hong Kong rapidly developed in its textile
industry, but then it deindustrialized it because of increasing costs, and it did not
upgrade this labor-intensive industry to be high tech. If China provides subsidies and
government grants to support local firms’ R&D to develop their own core
technologies, these core technologies will then push industrial development further.
Properly imposed tariffs and quotas can give time for domestic firms to mature, yet
they can also be removed to push domestic firms to grow. Strong industrial policies
and effective management will help developing countries, including China, develop
strong industries.
Automobiles become common goods in Chinese people’s life rather than a
luxury or political symbol a decade ago. Middle-class families can afford an
automobile for everyday use; lower middle classes prefer electric motorcycles since
no license or insurance is needed, even though they are required by law. China’s
automobile industry develops fast in three decades from a subpar industry to a highly
developed industry that can export not only the end products but also technology and
production plants (Sina Auto Channel, 2003, 2007; China Net, 2007; Zhou, 2012).
Now, China can export its automobiles to East Europe, Middle East, Latin America
and African countries (Sina Auto Channel, 2003, 2007; China Net, 2007; Zhou, 2012).
Electric cars become popular in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. In order to
protect the environment and reduce emission, local government provides encouraging
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subsidies to support people who want to buy a new energy car and they do not need to
be limited by the quota for getting license plate in large cities (East Today, 2016).
Vehicles on the road are mostly domestically made due to lower prices and decent
quality. However, rapid increase in automobiles brings a lot of troubles in the urban
area. Traffic jam, air pollution and insufficient parking lots trouble drivers in most
cities throughout the country. Particularly, air pollution is not only due to the
increasing number of automobiles, but also the state-owned oil industry that produces
low quality gas (Yang, 2017). Rapid development has brought Chinese people to a
higher living standard, but also new issues and challenges that wait to be solved.
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